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for a purpose foreign to the attachment, but was related
directly to the effect of the entry of judgment on its continuance. The fact that judgment had been entered was not
recited merely incidentally, but as the very basis for the
intended motion. Defendant may have been premature in
noticing her motion to dissolve the attachment, but by doing
so she gave plaintiff all the notice of the entry of judgment
to ·which he was entitled. When he failed within five days to
perfect an appeal from the judgment, defendant was entitled
to have the attachment dissolved.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
'27, 1954. Carter, J., and rrraynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22341.

In Bank.

Jan. 5, 1954.]

CHAH,LES Bl~YJijRBACH, Appellant, v. JUNO OIL COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Ilesponclents.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation
-Security for Costs and .Attorneys' Fees.-\Yhile Corp. Code,
~ 83'1, requiring- stockholder in derivative action to furnish
security for defrendants' rexpenses if trial court finds that
there is no reasonable probability that corporation will benefit
from action, does not eontain a eomparable provision requiring
corporation to post
for stockholder's expenses if trial
court finds a probability that corporation will benefit, this is
not a denial of equal protection, since stockholder will not
incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to bring in
equity a suit in corporation's right and, if he does bring suit,
he knows that he, like all others in his class, will be subject
to regulating- provisions of statute.
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Judgment-Costs and Counsel Fees.-Although the law does not

[1] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Corporations, ~§ 225, 226; Am.Jur., Corporations, § 471.
McK. Dig. Reference::;: [1, 3, 5, 6, 9-14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23] Corporations, § 368.5; [2] Corporations, § 368; [ 4, 8] Corporations,
§ 353; [7] Constitutional Law, § 150; [15] Bonds, ~ 2; [18, 19]
Corporations, § 363; [21] Motions, ~ 24(6),
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provide for deposit of security for stockholder's expenses at
beginning of his derivative action, it does provide for charging
against corporation costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who
has successfully maintained a representative action.
[3] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition prec'edent
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, does not unconstitutionally discriminate against poor stockholders who
are unable to furnish required security.
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Regulation by State.-A state may set terms on which it will permit
litigations in its courts, and no type of litigation is more susceptible of regulation than that instituted by a volunteer plaintiff-fiduciary who says that he seeks to enforce derivative
rights for a corporation which refuses to act through its board
of directors to the end he demands.
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Every stockholder who is unable to induce corporation, through its board of directors, to
institute a particular action on its behalf, and who undertakes
as its volunteer representative to sue on cause asserted by
him, may be required to furnish security pursuant to Corp.
Code, § 834; the fact that there may be individual defendants
who are sued by corporation on causes deemed proper by it,
rather than by a self-nominated stockholder-fiduciary on causes
deemed proper by him, and who thus cannot have benefit of
security, is no cause for complaint by stockholder in derivative
action who refuses to furnish security ordered by court for
both corporation and individual defendants.
[6] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-It would be an abuse of discretion for trial court to make an award of costs or attorneys'
fees in favor of a losing defendant and against a representative plaintiff in a situation where derivative suit materially
benefited corporation.
[7] Constitutional Law-Class Legislation-Legislative Power.So long as basis of classification is reasonable, the Legislature
can provide that in various types of action only a successful
plaintiff or appellant can recover attorneys' fees or only a defendant can appeal.
[8] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation
-Validity of Legislation Governing.-Since there is a reasonable basis for legislative determination that there is a probability that remedy of stockholder's derivative suit may be
abused! and that it is not unlikely that some stockholders may
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institute such a suit merely to gain personal advantage by
obtaining a settlement from corporate defendant rather than
to benefit such defendant, that determination is binding on the
courts.
[9] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-The Legislature, for protection of third persons who have dealt with corporation and for
protection of its office~s and employes, can constitutionally
require that stockholder who would act as in nature of guardian
ad litem must, as a condition of prosecuting action on behalf
of corporation, either show a reasonable probability that suit
will be successful or secure payment of defendants' expenses
should they prevail.
[10] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, does not violate
federal and state requirements of due process (U.S. Const.,
Amendment V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13), since it is on!~·
1·easonable expenses in an amount to be determined by court
on notice and hearing which plaintiff may be required to secure.
[11] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-On motion for order requiring
stockholder to furnish security for reasonable expenses which
might be incurred by defendants in connection with his derivative action, it is for trial court to weigh evidence and its
finding, based on substantial conflicting evidence, is binding
on appellate court as in every civil case.
[12] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to
security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent
to maintenance of stockholder's derivative suit, was not intended to be limited to strike suits, as distinguished from bona
fide suits.
(13] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-It was not unreasonable as a
matter of law for trial court to require stockholder to furnish
security of $1,000 for corporation named as defendant in
stockholder's derivative suit, where it was proper for corporation to employ counsel and appear in proceeding, and order
requiring deposit of such sum did not constitute a determination that that would be amount of corporation's costs and
reasonable attorney's fees which, under Corp. Code, § 834,
could not be determined until completion of suit.
[14] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Order of trial court requiring
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stockholder to furnish security of $5,000 for each of individual
defendants in stockholder's derivatil'e suit was not so excessive
as to constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law where,
at time order was made, it had to be contemplated that attorneys for these defendants would have to defend against
representative suit on merits at a possibly extended trial if
plaintiff saw fit to furnish security and continue suit; where
complaint sought not only to compel assignment of oil lease but
also an accounting and recovery of more than $75,000 alleged
to have been wrongfully collected and withheld by such de·
fendants; and where possibility of services and costs on appeal
was to be considered.
[15] Bonds-Form and Requisites.-,Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1041,
1057, relating to form and requisites of bond in civil actions,
do not require acceptance of an undertaking executed by two
residents and householders in every case where security is
necessary; the code simply prescribes what the sureties must
undertake and what officer taking bond must require in event
a freeholders' bond can be and is furnished.
[16] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.--Corp. Code,
§ 834, relating to security for costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent to maintenance of stockholder's derivative
suit, does not prescribe type of security which can be required;
it leaves matter to sound discretion of trial court.
[17] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-'\Vhere trial court deterrninc:s
on sufficient evidence that there is slight probability that
stockholder's derivative suit has merit, and where from natm·e
and multiplicity of issues involved it appears that trial might
be extended and that counsel might have to prosecute or de"
fend appeals, it cannot be held as a matter of law that court
abused its discretion in requiring stockholder to furnish security
for costs in form of cash or bonds issued by surety company.
[18] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Parties.
-Corporation is an indispensable party to a representative
action brought on its behalf; its rights, not those of nominal
plaintiff, are to be litigated, and court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate its rights in its absence as a party.
[19] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Parties.
-Dismissal of corporation at any stage in a representative
action must result in discontinuance of action, not for mere
defect in parties, but for lack of jurisdiction to proceed.
[20] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Where stockholder in derivative action refused to deposit security required for corporation; the action could not continue against that indispensable
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party, or in its absence against any other party, and trial court
had no alternative but to dismiss as to all defendants.
[21) Motions-Orders-Vacation-Notice of Motion.-Trial court
is without power to set aside an order involving judicial action
regularly made, and enter another and different order without
notice to adverse party.
[22) Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation
-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-Purported orders
of trial court postponing time for deposit of security required
of stockholder in derivative suit, having been made e:x; parte,
were ineffective.
[23] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-\Vhere stockholder's motion
to change form and amount of security required of him to
maintain derivative suit is properly before court on notice and
after argument, court has power to reconsider questions of
appropriate amount and form of security, but whether it
should grant or deny such motion is addressed to its sound
discretion.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare
County. Frank Lamberson, Judge. Affirmed.
Stockholder's derivative action to compel individual defendants to transfer an oil lease to defendant corporation, and
for an accounting. ,Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Zeutzius & Steffes, A. P. G. Steffes and Jamison & Jamison
for Appellant.
Harry E. Templeton, Jessie Miller, Guy Knupp, Jr., and
Burford & Hubler for Respondents.
O'Melvcny & Myers, William W. Alsup, Philip F. Westbrook, Jr., Loeb & Loeb, Allen E. Susman, John L. Cole and
Herman F. Selvin, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff, a stockholder of defendant Juno
Oil Company, instituted a stockholder's derivative suit to
compel defendants Henderson and Carpenter to transfer a
eertain oil lease to defendant Juno Oil Company and to
account for and pay to Juno sums reeeived under the lease
as rents and royalties. Defendants moved, under section 834
of the Corporations Code, for an order requiring plaintiff to
furnish security for reasonable expenses which might be
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incurred by defendants in connection with the action. Plaintiff failed to deposit security as ordered by the trial court
and the court dismissed the action. F'rom the judgment of
dismissal plaintiff appeals. He contends that the applicable
portions of section 834 are unconstitutional, particularly in
their requirement that plaintiff furnish security for the expenses of individual defendants who are sued not as officers
or employes of defendant corporation but as third persons
who dealt with the corporation; that defendants established
no ground for requiring any security or, in the alternative,
that the trial court abused its discretion as to the amount and
form of security required; and that the court erred in dismissing the action at a time when plaintiff's motion to modify
the original order in respect to its requirements as to form
and amount of security was pending. \Ve have concluded
that each of these contentions is without merit.
The applicable provisions of section 834 are found in paragraph (b) thereof. They are as follows: Within 30 days
after service of summons in a stockholder's derivative suit
the corporation or any defendant may move for an order,
on notice and hearing, requiring plaintiff to furnish security.
The motion may be based on either of the following grounds:
( 1) that there is no reasonable probability that prosecution
of the cause of action against the moving party will benefit
the corporation or its security holders; (2) that the moving
party, if other than the corporation, did not participate in
the transaction complained of in any capacity. At the hearing on the motion the conrt shall consider evidence material
to the grounds of the motion and, when material, to a determination of the probable reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense of the action. If the court determines that the moving party has established a probability
in support of the grounds of the motion, it shall fix the
amount and nature of security to be furnished by plaintiff
for reasonable exprnses, including expenses for which the
corporation may become liable under section 830 of the Corportions Code. 1 A determination as to the furnishing of
security is not a determination of the merits of any issue
in the action. ''The corporation and the moving party shall
have recourse to such security in such amount as the court
1
Section 830 provides for indemnification by a corporation of a director, officer or employe for reasonable expenses incurred in defending
a suit against him which is based on his alleged wrong to the corporation, if he has successfully defended or if the court finds that his conduct
merits indemnity.
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shall determine upon the termination of such action.''
The amount of security must be reasonable and may be
changed from time to time within the court's discretion. If
the court requires that security be furnished as to any defendant, the action shall be dismissed as to such defendant
unless the security has been furnished within a reasonable
time fixed by the court.
The complaint herein alleges that plaintiff, defendant Henderson, and Scott Carpenter 2 orally agreed that defendant
Juno Oil Company would be organized to operate oil leases
to be acquired by plaintiff and the individual defendants
and transferred to the corporation in consideration of stock
to be issued by it; that the corporation was formed and the
stock issued; that plaintiff acquired and transferred to Juno
certain oil leases; that the individual defendants undertook
to and did acquire a certain oil lease, known as the Norris
lease, but refused to transfer it to Juno as agreed; and that
Juno, despite plaintiff's demands, refused to compel transfer
of the Norris lease. The complaint seeks to compel transfer
of such lease and payment to the corporation of proceeds
therefrom allegedly received by the individual defendants for
the benefit of the corporation.
Each defendant moved, under section 834 of the Corporations Code, that plaintiff be required to furnish security for
probable reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, which
might be incurred in defending the action. The motions were
based on the ground that there was no reasonable probability
that prosecution of the action would benefit the corporation
and, in the case of the individual defendants, on the further
ground that they did not participate in the transaction complained of. The trial court at the hearing of the motions
considered substantially conflicting affidavits and testimony.
By formal order dated August 27, 1951, the trial court ordered that "plaintiff shall, within thirty days from the date
hereof, deposit" security of $5,000 as to each of the individual
defendants and $1,000 as to Juno, in the form of cash or
bonds of a surety company, and that if plaintiff "fails to
2
Scott Carpenter is since deceased. The administratrix of his estate
is named as a defendant. For convenience Henderson and Carpenter
will sometimes be referred to as the individual defendants.
Plaintiff also joined three other individuals, directors of .runo Oil
Co., as defendants, but he has since dismissed his appeal as to them
because he wishes to emphasize issues as to the application of the security
requirement to those who assertedly wrong the corporation, not as
officers or employes, but as strangers.
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provide such security for any of the defendants herein, within
the time herein provided, then upon a proper showing thereof,
this action shall be dismissed as to any or all defendants for
whom such security has not been given in the sums and in the
manner as herein specified. ''
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff obtained an ex parte order
which purported to grant him 30 days from the date thereof
in which to deposit the security, and on October 22, 1951,
plaintiff obtained another ex parte order which purported
to grant him 30 days from the date thereof in which to
deposit the security. On October 26, 1951, plaintiff :filed a
"Notice of Motion for Order Changing the Amount and Form
of Security,'' by which he asked that the amount of security
be reduced to $2,000 as to the individual defendants and
$400 as to Juno, that plaintiff be permitted to :file an undertaking executed by personal sureties, and that such security
be furnished on or before December 1, 1951.
On October 30, 1951, defendants :filed notices of motions
to dismiss the action on the ground that plaintiff had failed
to deposit the security required by the order of August 27,
1951. On November 19, 1951, the motions of plaintiff to
change the form and amount of security and of defendants
to dismiss the action were argued and taken under submission.
On November 27, 1951, defendant Juno Oil Company :filed
another notice of motion to dismiss, and on November 28,
1951, the individual defendants filed a similar notice of
motion. These motions were heard and submitted on December 3.
On December 14, 1951, the trial court granted the last
mentioned motions of defendants. On December 19 the
court denied plaintiff's motion to change the amount and
form of security, denied without prejudice defendants' motions to dismiss of which notice had been :filed on October 30,
and entered the judgment of dismissal from which this appeal
is taken.
It appears that plaintiff did not comply with any part
of the order for security. Instead, he contends that section
834 violates the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution (Amendment XIV, § 1) and the provisions of the
state Constitution against special laws (art. IV, § 25) and
against special privileges and immunities (art. I, § 21).
Fundamentally, plaintiff's arguments as to constitutionality
are answered, either directly or by necessary implication, by
Cohen v. Beneficial Indttsirial Loan Corp. (1949), 337 U.S.
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541 [ 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 I;. Ed. 1528] (which upheld the constitutionality of a New ,Jersey statute with a purpose similar
to that of section 834; so far as appears, the New Jersey
statute contained no provision as to, and the opinion does
not discuss, individual defendants who were not officers or
employes) and Hogan v. Ingold (1952), 38 Cal.2d 802 [243
P.2d 1] (in which the problem as to such individual defendants did not arise) ; see, also, Whitten v. Dabney (1915),
171 Cal. 621, 631 [154 P. 312] (which did not involve the
problem of constitutionality of the statute but which pointed
out that "Not only should a plaintiff in such a fiduciary
capacity [held to be equivalent to that of a guardian ad
litem, who is not in his own right a party to the cause] be
willing to take no act that did not first receive the sanction
of the court of equity to which he has appealed, but, more
than this, he is not permitted to take any act without such
sanction"). However, inasmuch as some of the particular
aspects of plaintiff's arguments as to the constitutionality of
a provision for security for and possible indemnification of an
individual defendant who is not sued as an officer or employe
of a corporation appear to be advanced in this case for the
first time, we give specific consideration to those aspects of
his argumenJ;s.
[l] 'l'he unconstitutional discrimination exists, says plaintiff, because section 834 requires plaintiff to furnish security
for defendants' expenses if the trial court finds that there
is no reasonable probability that the corporation will benefit
from the derivative action, but does not contain a comparable
provision requiring the corporation to post security for plaintiff's expenses if the trial court finds a probability that the
corporation will benefit. This is not a denial of equal protection. As was pointed out in Hogan v. Ingold (1952),
s~tpra, 38 Cal.2d 802, 812, ''If the power of the state over
this type of fiduciary litigation is plenary, as the Cohen case
states [Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (1949),
s?tpra, 337 U.S. 541, 551], then surely such litigation is subject to regulation of the type provided by section 834. . . .
The stockholder will not incur any liability for costs if he
does not essay to bring in equity a suit in the corporation's
right. If he does bring such a suit he knows that he [like
all others in his class] will be subject to the regulating
provisions of the statute.''
[2] .Although the law does not provide for deposit of security
for plaintiff's expenses at the beginning of his action, it
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does provide, apart from statute, for charging against the
corporation the costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who has
successfully maintained a representative action. (F'ox v. Hale
& Norcross S.M. Co. (1895), 108 Cal. 475, 477 [41 P. 328];
Mason v. Drug, Inc. (1939), 31 Cal.App.2d 697, 702 [88
P.2d 929]; see, also, Mann v. Superior Court (1942), 53
Cal.App.2d 272, 282 [127 P.2d 970]; 152 A.L.R. 914.)
Since counsel fees for maintaining the action in such a
situation are measured in a material part by the benefits
recovered on behalf of the corporation, and both costs and
counsel fees are charged against the corporation and may be
made payable out of or a lien against the fund recovered,
there is little likelihood that a plaintiff might successfully
maintain the action and yet be unable to collect an award
for his expenses.
[3] Plaintiff argues that section 834 unconstitutionally
discriminates against poor stockholders who are unable to
furnish the required security. But if plaintiff's argument
in this respect were accepted then any statute which required
the payment of a fee or the furnishing of security as a prerequisite to the filing of a complaint, the issuance or levying
of a writ, the procurement of a record on appeal, etc., would
be unconstitutional. Plaintiff relies upon Morganti v. Morganti (1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 512, 516 [222 P.2d 78] (see,
also, Dribin v. Sttperior Court (1951), 37 Cal.2d 345, 349-350
[231 P.2d 809, 24 A.L.R.2d 864]), where it was held that
the right to divorce an incurably insane spouse could not
constitutionally be limited to those who could guarantee that
the spouse would be supported for his or her life expectancy.
The lVIorganti case is not controlling or persuasive here;
rather, the analogies suggested by defendants (requirement
of filing fees, etc.) are pertinent. (See, also, Escobedo v.
State of California (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 878 [222 P.2d 1].)
lVIore basically, it is also pointed out that the plaintiff here is
not seeking to enforce any personal right; rather, he is seeking
to have the court accept his nomination of himself to act in
a fiduciary capacity in the nature of a guardian ad litem.
[4] As held in Cohen v. Beneficial Indttstrial Loan Corp.
(1949), supra, 337 U.S. 541, 549 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed.
1528], a state may set the terms on which it will permit
litigations in its courts, and no type of litigation is more
susceptible of regulation than that instituted by a volunteer
plaintiff-fiduciary who says that he seeks to enforce derivative
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rights for a corporation which refuses to act through its board
of directors to the end he demands.
[5] Section 834 is unconstitutionally discriminatory in
another respect, says plaintiff, because if the individual defendants had been sued by the defendant corporation itself,
rather than by plaintiff stockholder in his representative
capacity, they would not have been entitled to security. This
effect of the statute does not create an unreasonable classification ; every stockholder who, like plaintiff, is unable to
induce the corporation, through its board of directors, to
institute a particular action on its own behalf, and who undertakes as its volunteer representative to sue on the cause asserted by him, may be required to furnish security. The
fact that there may be individual defendants who are sued
by a corporation on causes deemed proper by it, rather than
by a self-nominated stockholder-fiduciary on causes deemed
proper by him, and thus cannot have the benefit of security,
is not a cause for complaint by this plaintiff.
Plaintiff points out that if he did furnish security and
the action were prosecuted to judgment, defendants might
"have recourse to such security in such amount as the
court shall determine upon the termination of such action,''
and that under this last quoted portion of section 834 the
individual defendants might be allowed to recover attorneys'
fees from plaintiff if they ultimately prevailed, whereas plaintiff could not recover such fees from the individual defendants if he prevailed. For reasons and on the authorities
already discussed as well as those immediately hereinafter
summarized, there is no merit in this contention. In extension of the same point plaintiff objects, further, that if
the quoted language is read literally the defendants, both
corporate and individual, might be allowed to recover expenses although plaintiff prevailed in the action. The present
case has not come to the state where the last-mentioned problems would arise. [6] However, in answer to the last argument, it may be suggested that it would appear to be an abuse
of discretion for a trial court to make an award of costs or
attorneys' fees in favor of a losing defendant and against a
representative plaintiff in a situation where the suit materially
benefited the corporation.
In support of his above stated contentions, plaintiff relies
upon Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor (1907), 150 Cal.
265, 268-269 [88 P. 982, 119 .Am.St.Rep. 193, 17 L.R..A.N.S.
909], The statute under consideration there provided for
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an award of attorneys' fees only to those who established
their claims under the mechanics' lien law and not to those
who successfully resisted such claims of lien. This court held,
"A statute which gives an attorney's fee to one party in an
action and denies it to the other, and allows such fee in one
kind of action and not in other kinds of actions where, as in
the statute here in question, the distinction is not founded
on constitutional or natural differences, is clearly violative
of the constitutional provisions above noticed [U.S. Const.,
Amendment XIV] Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 21, art. IV,
§ 25]. '' [7] However, as the Builders' Supply case recognizes and as defendants and amici curiae point out, so long
as the basis of the classification is reasonable, the Legislature
can provide that in various types of action only a successful
plaintiff or appellant can recover attorneys' fees or only a
defendant can appeal. (Missouri, K. &: T. R. Co. v. Cade
(1914), 233 U.S. 642, 649 [34 S.Ct. 678, 58 L.Ed. 1135]
[statute providing that any person may present to his debtor
a bona fide claim for services rendered, material furnished,
overcharges on or damage to freight, or injury to stock, and
that if the debtor does not pay within 30 days such person
can sue upon the claim and, if his suit is successful, can
recover not only costs but also reasonable attorneys' fees] ;
Engebretsen v. Gay (1910), 158 Cal. 30, 32 [109 P. 880,
Ann.Cas. 1912A 690, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 1062] [Stats. 1885, p.
147, as amended (Deering's Gen. Laws (1906), Act 3930,
§ 12), providing that plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees
as well as costs in successful action to recover unpaid amount
of street assessment] ; Supe1·ior Wheeler Cake Corp. v. Superior Court (1928), 203 Cal. 384, 386-387 [264 P. 488]
[former Code Civ. Proc., § 927j (Stats. 1921, p. 120), providing that unsuccessful defendant but not unsuccessful plaintiff can appeal from judgment of small claims court; the court
emphasizes that it was plaintiff who invoked the quick and
inexpensive small claims procedure and that if plaintiff
wished a mutual right of appeal he could have invoked the
regular jurisdiction of the justice's court] ; Sacramento M. U.
Dist. v. Pacific Gas &: Elec. Co. (1942), 20 Cal.2d 684, 693696 [128 P.2d 529] [Code Civ. Proc., § 526b, providing that
if an unsuccessful plaintiff in a suit to enjoin the sale of
public utility's bonds is interested in a public utility business
of the same nature as that for which the bonds are proposed,
such plaintiff is liable to the defendant for the costs, damages,
and necessary expenses resulting from the suit] ; City of
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Alhtras v. Superior Court (1940), 36 Cal.App.2d 457, 459
[97 P.2d 816] [Code Civ. Proc., § 117j, providing that if a
final judgment of the superior court is rendered against a
defendant who appeals from a judgment of the small claims
court he shall pay plaintiff an attorney's fee].)
[8] The Ijeg·islature could determine that normally the
officers and employes of corporations do not mismanage the
corporation's funds, that usually if third persons deal wrongfully with the corporation the directors cause it to prosecute
any proper right of action in its own name, and that it is
not unlikely that some stockholders may abuse the remedy
of the representative suit and institute such a suit (sometimes called a "strike suit") to gain personal advantage by
obtaining a settlement from the corporate defendant rather
than to benefit such defendant. 3 The Legislature could further take cognizance of the notorious fact that the bringing
of groundless derivative suits by irresponsible persons has
in some jurisdictions approached the character of a "racket."
(Cohen v. Beneficial Indttstrial Loan Corp. (1949), supra, 337
U.S. 541, 548-549; Lapchak v. Baker (1948), 298 N.Y. 89,
94-95 [80 N.E.2d 751] .) It has been suggested that the
representative suit has not been abused by the bringing of
''strike suits'' in California as it has in some eastern states.
But since there is a reasonable basis for the legislative
determination that there is a probability that the remedy
may be abused, that determination is binding upon the courts,
and to assert that representative suits have not been used in
bad faith in this state does not aid the stockholder in his
attempt to have the legislation stricken down. (See Sacrantento M. U. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1942), supra,
20 Cal.2d 684, 694.) [9] In these circumstances the Legislature, for the protection of third persons who have dealt
with the corporation, as well as for the protection of the
corporation and its officers and employes, can constitutionally
require that the stockholder who would act as in the nature
of a guardian ad litem must, as a condition of prosecuting
the action on behalf of the corporation, either show a reasonable probability that the suit will be successful or secure
3
As amici curiae point out, the Legislature could also determine that
''a plaintiff generally finds it easier to employ an attorney on a wholly
contingent basis than does a defendant, thus not assuming any personal
liability for fees unless he is successful, whereas a defendant will ordinarily have incurred such a liability regardless of the outcome of the
case.''
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the payment of the defendants' expenses should they prevail.
'l'he Legislature, of course, can attribute some weight to the
fact that the corporation has not seen fit to institute action
on a cause which either belongs to it or to no one.
[10] Plaintiff argues that section 834 violates not only
the requirement of equal protection but also the federal .and
state requirements of due process (U.S. Const., Amend.
V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13). This argument is answered by
the consideration that it is only reasonable expenses in an
amount to be determined by the court on notice and hearing
which plaintiff may be required to secure. (See Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (1949), supra, 337 U.S. 541,
552.) It is to be noted that the California statute is even
less susceptible to the charge that it violates due process than
is the New Jersey statute upheld in the Cohen case, for the
California statute contains the safeguard, not found in the
New Jersey statute, of a preliminary showing by defendants
that there is no reasonable probability of benefit to the corporation from prosecution of the action.
Plaintiff claims that defendants have not met their burden
of proving that there is no reasonable probability that prosecution of the action will benefit the corporation or its security holders. The evidence on this matter is conflicting. 4
[11] "It is for the trial court to weigh the evidence and
its finding, based upon substantial conflicting evidence, is
in this as in every civil case binding upon the appellate
4
There is no written memorandum representing the entire agreement
among the parties. The factual dispute is as to whether such agreement
(which, so far as it was carried out, required organization of the
eorporation and issuance of shaTes to plaintiff and the individual defondants in consideration of plaintiff's transferring certain oil leases
to tho corporation and the individual defendants' paying certain sums
to plaintiff) also required Carpenter and Henderson to acquire and
transfer to the cmporation the Norris lease, for which they were negotiating. Plaintiff testified that at a meeting of the parties prior
to orgnnization Carpenter and Henderson agreed to transfer such lease.
Henderson testified that at such a meeting of the parties he said he
would not transfer his interest in the Norris lease and Carpenter
(since deceased) stated that he wanted more time to think the
matter over. Another individual defendant, not a respondent here,
testified that at such meeting Henderson said he would not transfer
the Norris lease to the company and Carpenter said that he could not
act at the time because the lease was ''in litigation.'' Still another
individual defendant testified that he did not recall hearing Carpenter
say that he would transfer his interest to the company; that he said
the lease "was under litigation . . . and nothing could be done about
it.'' Although the testimony as to the dates of the meetings referred to
is uncertain, the trier of fact could resolve such testimony favorable
to defendants and find that at no time did Henderson and Carpenter
agree to transfer the Norris lease to Juno.
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court." (Wood v. Gordon (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 374, 376
[246 P.2d 84].) In connection with his argument that defendants have not sustained their burden of proof as to
lack of reasonable probability of benefit to the corporation
or its security holders, plaintiff says further, "Manifestly,
this is not such a 'strike suit' as was mentioned by the United
States Supreme Court in its decision in the Cohen case. If
it is not such a 'strike suit,' then the only possible reason
for allowing security and costs for attorneys' fees entirely
disappears.'' But the question before the trial court was not
whether this was a ''strike suit''; the question for that court
was whether, regardless of plaintiff's motive in instituting
the action, there was or was not a probability of benefit to
the corporate defendant. [12] ''The argument that the statute
was intended and should be limited to strike suits is unavailing in view of its language." (Wood v. Gordon (1952),
supra, p. 377 of 112 Cal.App.2d.)
Since defendants' motion for security was properly granted
on the ground that there was no reasonable probability that
the action will benefit the corporation, plaintiff's contention
that the individual defendants have not shown that they ''did
not participate in the transaction complained of" need not
be considered.
Plaintiff urges that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering that he furnish an excessive amount of security to
Juno, Henderson, and Carpenter. As previously stated,
plaintiff was ordered to furnish security of $1,000 for Juno
and $5,000 each for Henderson and Carpenter. Even if
we assume, as argued by plaintiff, that if the action is to
be tried on its merits it is Henderson and Carpenter who
will carry the main burden of defending the suit and that
the corporation need not actively resist the claims of plaintiff
(see Meyers v. Smith (1933), 190 Minn. 157, 159 [251 N.W.
20) ; 87utzlcer v. Rieber (1942), 132 N.J.Eq. 412, 413, 415
[28 A.2d 528]; Chaplin v. Selznic:k (1945), 186 Misc. 66 [58
N.Y.S.2d 453, 455] ), it does not follow that the amount fixed
as to any defendant is unreasonable and beyond the range
of judicial discretion. Obviously, it is proper for the corporation, if its position is justified at all, to employ counsel,
appear in the proceeding by answer or otherwise, and move
for the deposit of security for its expenses. It may be that
if plaintiff had deposited security and the action had been
tried, it might have developed that $1,000 would have ex-
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ceeded the amount of Juno's reasonable expenses. [13] But
it does not appear as a matter of law that it was unreasonable
to require security of $1,000 at the time the order was made.
And the order that $1,000 be deposited as security does not
constitute a determination that that will be the amount of
Juno's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees ; plaintiff is mistaken in his assertion that such order ''was in effect an
order fixing a retainer of $1,000.00 for the corporation'' ;
under section 834 the amount of costs and attorneys' fees
cannot be determined until the completion of the suit.
[14] The requirement of security of $5,000 each as to
Henderson and Carpenter does not appear so excessive (if
excessive at all) as to constitute an abuse of discretion as
a matter of law. At the time the order was made it had
to be contemplated that the attorneys for those individual
defendants would have to defend against the representative
suit on the merits at a possibly extended trial if plaintiff
saw fit to furnish the security and continue such suit; the
complaint seeks not only to compel assignment of a described
oil lease but also an accounting and the recovery of more
than $75,000 alleged to have been wrongfully collected and
withheld by the individual defendants; and the possibility
of services and costs on appeal was to be considered. Pertinent to this subject-and tending also to derogate plaintiff's
more basic arguments against the type of legislation here
involved-is the fact that although no security has been furnished, defendants' attorneys have already rendered substantial services in the superior court on the primary and counter
motions and on this appeal in defense of the attack made
by plaintiff on the constitutionality of section 834 and the
propriety of its application here.
Plaintiff's objection to the order requiring deposit of
security extends not only to the amount but also to the form
of security. The superior court ordered "that said security
shall be deposited in the form of cash or a bond or bonds
issued by a security company authorized to issue such bonds.''
As already mentioned, after the making of this order plaintiff moved for an order changing the amount and form of
security. In support of this motion he filed an affidavit which
avers that although he has assets the fair market value of which
exceeds the amount of security required, he would sustain
financial loss by converting those assets into cash, and that
the surety companies which execute the bonds which the court
order permits him to furnish demand cash collateral in the
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total amount of such bonds. It appears that before the trial
court plaintiff emphasized the hardship to himself resulting
from the requirement of cash, rather than the sufficiency or
reasonableness of the form of security as a protection to the
defendants.
[15] On appeal plaintiff argues that the Code of Civil
Procedure ( §§ 1041, 1057) 5 provides that wherever a bond is
required by any law of this state it may be an undertaking
executed by two residents and householders, or freeholders,
within the state. There is no such requirement of the acceptance of an undertaking executed by personal sureties in every
case where security is necessary; the Code of Civil Procedure
simply prescribes what the sureties must undertake and what
the officer taking the bond must require in the event a freeholders' bond can be and is furnished. [16] Section 834 of
the Corporations Code, which relates specifically to and
controls the present proceeding, does not prescribe the type
of security which can be required; its provision that "the
court shall fix the nature and amount of security" leaves the
matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. [17] Where
the trial court determines upon sufficient evidence that there
is slight probability that plaintiff's representative suit has
merit and where from the nature and multiplicity of issues
involved it appears that the trial might be an extended one,
and that counsel might have to prosecute or defend appeals,
we cannot hold that the court, as a matter of law, abused
its discretion in fixing either the amounts or character of
security here prescribed.
It is furthermore to be observed that, regardless of the
propriety of the order requiring deposit of security for the
individual defendants, the judgment of dismissal is, for another and independent reason, the only proper judgment
here. Plaintiff failed and refused to furnish the security for
the corporation as ordered. [18] The corporation is an in"Those sections provide in material part as follows:
Section 1041: "Whenever a party to an action or proceeding desires
to give an undertaking provided to be given by any statute of this
State, it shall be sufficient if the sureties sign an undertaking indicating
that they are bound to the obligations of the statute requiring the
undertaking to be given. Such undertaking may be in form as follows: ... "
Section 1057: "In any case where an undertaking or bond is authorized or required by any law of this State, the officer taking the same
must . . . require the sureties to accompany it with an affidavit that
they are each residents and householders, or freeholders, within the
State, and are each worth the sum specified in the undertaking . . . ''
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dispensable party to a representative action brought on its
behalf; its rights, not those of the nominal plaintiff, are to
be litigated, and the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
its rights in its absence as a party. [19] Dismissal of the
corporation at any stage in a representative action must result
in a discontinuance of the action, not for a mere defect in
parties, but for lack of jurisdiction to proceed. (Beach v.
Cooper (1887), 72 Cal. 99, 103 [13 P. 161]; Wickersham v.
Crittenden (1892), 93 Cal. 17, 33 [28 P. 788] ; Tu1·ner v.
Um"ted Mineral Lands Corp. (1941), 308 Mass. 531 [33 N.E.2d
282, 286].) [20] Therefore, when plaintiff refused to deposit the security required for the corporation, the action could
not continue against that indispensable party, or in its absence
against any other party, and the trial court had no alternative
but to dismiss as to all defendants.
Plaintiff contends, finally, that the court below erroneously
dismissed the action at a time when his motion to change the
amount and form of security was pending. As previously
stated, the order of August 27, 1951, required that plaintiff
deposit security within 30 days and that if he did not do so
the action, upon proper showing, should be dismissed. Twice
on ex parte application of plaintiff a judge signed an order
purporting in effect to modify the original order (which
had been regularly entered after hearing on notice) by extending the time for deposit of the security. [21] Although
defendants have, for the purpose of argument, assumed that
the ex parte orders might be effective, at least in part, this
assumption is contrary to the established rule that "the trial
court is without power to set aside an order involving judicial
action and regularly made, and enter another and different
order without notice to the adverse party." (Harth v. Ten
Eyck (1941), 16 Cal.2d 829, 834 [108 P.2d 675]; Bond v.
Fanners & Merchants Nat. Bank (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 842,
848 [149 P.2d 722] .) [22] In this case the determination,
and the fixing by the order, of the period which under all
the circumstances shown would constitute a reasonable time
for the furnishing of the security was just as much a part
of the ''judicial action'' as was the determination and fixing
of the amount and character of the security to be required.
A motion seeking to amend that order in any particular which
had been fixed as a part of judicial action could be entertained only upon notice to the adverse parties. It follows that
the purported orders postponing the time for deposit of the
security, having been made ex parte, were ineffective.
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[23] Plaintiff's subsequent motion to change the form
and amount of security and the date for furnishing the same,
hovvever, was properly before the court for disposition, upon
notice and after <:trgument. Section 834 of the Corporations
Code provides, ''The amount of such security may thereafter
from time to time be increased or decreased in the discretion
of the court upon showing that the security provided has or
may become inadequate or is excessive.'' The trial court
had power to reconsider the questions of the appropriate
amount and form of security (see Harth v. TenEyck (1941),
snpTa, pp. 833-834 of 16 Cal.2d) and it did reconsider those
questions. Bnt whether it should grant or deny plaintiff's
motion was a matter addressed to its sound discretion. And
it was only after it had determined, in the exercise of that
discretion, that the motion should be denied that, on December
19, 1951, it entered tl1e judgment of dismissal. The fact that
the minute order for dismissal was entered on December 14
is immaterial.
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., S11enk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
EDMONDS, .J.-I concur in the judgment upon the ground
that the plaintiit failed to provide security for the corporation
as ordered by the court.
CARTER, J.--I dissent.
It is my considered opinion that certain portions of section
834 of the Corporations Code, as applied here, are unconstitutional, particularly the requirement that plaintiff shareholder in a derivative snit furnish security for the expenses
of individual defendants who are sued, not as officers or
employees of defendant corporation, but as third persons who
dealt ·with the corporation. Such a provision is violative of
the equal protection clanse of the federal Constitution (U. S.
Const., .Amendment XIV, § 1) and the provisions of the California Constitution against special laws (Cal. Const., art.
IV, 25).
Section 834 provides. that vvithin 30 days after service
of summons in a shareholder's action the corporation or other
defendant may move the court for an order requiring plaintiff shareholder to furnish security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees of the corporation and the
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moving party which will be incurred in the defense of the
action. This means that as a condition precedent to the maintenance of the action a stockholder plaintiff can be required
to post security not only for the corporation's expenses but
also for the expenses, including attorney's fees, of third party
defendants who are neither officers, directors, nor employees
of the corporat,ion. It is in this respect that I would hold
the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.
The majority recognizes the fact that this precise question
has never yet been decided, as it states: ''However, inasmuch
as some of the particular aspects of plaintiff's arguments
as to the constitutionality of a provision for security for and
possible indemnification of an individual defendant who is
not sued as an officer or employe of a corporation appear
to be advanced in this case for the first time we give specific
consideration to those aspects of his arguments.'' In spite of
this, the majority opinion proceeds to merely gloss over the
issue by inadequately discussing the principal constitutional
objection and then saying: ''Fundamentally, plaintiff's arguments as to constitutionality are answered, either directly or
by necessary implication, by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp . ... '' Following this statement it admits that
the New Jersey statute, involved in the Cohen case,"( . . . so
far as appears, . . . contained no provision as to, and the
opinion does not discuss, individual defendants who were
officers or employes). . . . ''
In the case of Cohen v. Beneficial Ind~~strial Loan Corp.,
supra, 337 U.S. 541, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring security to be posted for the corporation when a shareholder brings a representative suit. The
court there held that such a classification was a proper one
since the shareholder can be required by state legislation
to protect the corporation he seeks to represent. It said:
''And while the stockholders have chosen the corporate
director or manager, they have no such election as to a plaintiff who steps forward to represent them. He is a self-chosen
representative and a volunteer champion. The Federal Constitution does not oblige the state to place its litigating and
adjudicating processes at the disposal of such a representative,
at least without imposing standards of responsibility, liability
and accountability which it considers will protect the interests
he elects himself to repr·esent. (Emphasis added.) Thus it
would appear that it may be proper for a state to require a
stockholder plaintiff to protect the interests he is representing
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by posting security, but this cannot be construed to mean that
he is to protect all interests including the third party defendants against whom he proceeds. The majority also cites
Hogan v. Ingold, 38 Cal.2d 802 [243 P.2d 1], as answering
"either directly or by necessary implication" plaintiff's arguments as to the constitutionality of section 834 but it follows
this by saying : '' (in which the problem as to such individual
defendants did not arise). . . . "
The majority seems to feel that it is not essential to make
a complete study of this constitutional question as is illustrated by the following statement: ''. . . regardless of the
propriety of the order requiring deposit of security for the
individual defendants, the judgment of dismissal is, for another and independent reason, the only proper judgment here.
Plaintiff failed and refused to furnish the security for the
corporation as ordered . . . . Therefore, when plaintiff refused
to deposit the security required for the corporation, the action
could not continue against that indispensable party, or in its
absence against any other party, and the trial court had no
alternative but to dismiss as to all defendants.'' This argument is misleading as it overlooks the fact that even if plaintiff had posted security for the corporation he still would
not have been able to proceed against the other defendants
without :first furnishing the security prescribed as to them.
In view of this and the fact that grave questions of constitutionality were involved, plaintiff appears to have followed a
proper course of action by appealing from the order of dis~
missal.
It is well recognized that the equal protection clause prohibits discriminating and partial legislation in favor of particular persons as against others in like condition. The United
States Supreme Court has said that: ''. . . equal protection
and security should be given to all under like circumstances
in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all
persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness
and acquire and enjoy property; that they shot(ld have like
access to the courts of the c,ountry for the protection of their
persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs,
and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should
be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to
the same pursuits by others under like circumstances ; that no
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon
others in the same calling and condition . . . . " (Emphasis
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added; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 [5 S.Ct. 357,
28 hEel. 923].)
The equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature
from setting up different requirements for different types
and classes of litigants; however, a state legislature may not
arbitrarily select certain individuals for the operation of its
statutes since such selection is obnoxious to the equal protection clause. Legislation which is directed toward certain
limited individuals and not against others can only be sustained if the classification is a reasonable one based on adequate
grounds.
Under the provisions of section 834, a situation is presented
where the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit may be
required to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if he is unsuccessful, but the defendant is not required to pay plaintiff's
counsel fees if the latter wins. Such a statute gives one party
greater rights and advantages than the other and is invalid
unless there is some adequate reason why third party defendants should receive different treatment than the plaintiff shareholder. No such adequate reason has been advanced
by the majority and I am convinced the legislation is arbitrary
and a denial of the equal protection of the law in that the
classification is an unreasonable one.
Discriminatory legislation of this type was held unconstitutional in Bnilders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265
[88 P. 982, 119 Am.St.Rep. 193, 17 L.R.A.N.S. 909]. In that
case the mechanic's lien law provided for attorney's fees only
to those who established their claim under said law and not
to those who successfully resisted such claim of lien. In
holding such a law unconstitutional this court (p. 268) said:
''This provision is in our opinion violative both of the federal
and the state constitution-of the fourteenth amendment of
the former, which guarantees to every person 'the equal protection of the law,' and of the provisions of the state constitution which provide that general laws shall be uniform,
prohibit special laws, and declare the inalienable rights of
all men of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property. A
statute which gives an attorney's fee to one party in an action
and denies it to the other, and allows such fee in one kind
of action and not in other kinds of actions where, as in the
statute here in question, the distinction is not founded on
constitutional or natural differences, is clearly violative of
the constitutional provisions above noticed."
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If plaintiff did furnish security and the action were prosecuted to judgment the individual defendant, under section
834, could recover attorney's fees from plaintiff if they prevailed but plaintiff could not recover such fees from the
individual defendants if he prevailed. What sound basis
can there be for the provision in section 834 which gives a
third party defendant, who is not an officer or employee of
the defendant corporation, this preferential treatment? Merely
because an individual defendant is sued in a derivative suit
does not put him in any substantially different position than
if he had been sued directly by either the corporation or by
plaintiff and for this reason he should not be entitled to any
special consideration. It is true that the corporation shall
be responsible for the costs and counsel fees of a plaintiff who
has successfully maintained a shareholder's derivative suit
but this does not remedy the situation since the plaintiff
is still put to the disadvantage and expense of posting security
for a defendant who is under no corresponding disadvantage.
Even if the shareholder could ultimately prevail, this requirement of an advance security for each individual defendant might impose such a severe financial strain upon the
shareholder that he would be unable to raise the money and
consequently be unable to continue with the derivative suit.
In the instant case the trial court required a bond of $5,000
for each individual defendant. What if there had been 20 or
more such defendants? How many small shareholders are
in a position to post security bonds of $100,000 or more?
As a practical matter a requirement of this type would keep
most small shareholders from bringing derivative suits and
is therefore highly discriminatory.
It has been said that the purpose of statutes of this type
is to protect corporations, their directors, officers and employees against so-called ''strike suits'' and the litigation
expenses which may be unjustifiably foisted upon them;
however the California legislation goes beyond this in that
it imposes liability on the plaintiff for the expenses of successful stranger defendants under certain conditions.
It is frequently argued that the posting of such security
in favor of the corporate defendant is justifiable since where
the shareholder elects himself as the champion of the corporation's cause of action he should be liable for any expenses
which he brings about should he be unsuccessful. (See
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, 337 U.S.
42 C.2d-2
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541.) Such an argument is not applicable where such special
protection is given to a third party defendant who would be
entitled to no special consideration if he had been sued
directly by the corporation or by an individual plaintiff.
The mere fact that the individual defendant is sued in a derivative suit does not put him at any greater disadvantage
than if he were sued directly, and for this reason, he should
not be entitled to special protection at the expense of the
plaintiff shareholder.
Even prior to 1949 the California courts recognized that
a plaintiff must meet certain requirements in order to maintain a shareholder's derivative suit. Such requirements were
found necessary to protect corporations from the so-called
''strike suit'' or ''shakedown suit'' wherein a plaintiff sued
primarily to harass the corporation into a pecuniary settlement. The early case of Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621
[154 P. 312], helped to remove a primary cause of the strike
suit by holding that once commenced a stockholder plaintiff
could compromise his suit only under the strict surveillance
of the court. However, in 1949 with the passage of section
834, the California Legislature went even further in the curtailment of stockholder's derivative suits. The California
legislation was in part patterned after the New York Act
(N.Y. Gen. Corp. Laws, § 61-b) but it went far beyond its
predecessor in the requirement that plaintiff can now be held
liable for the expenses of successful stranger defendants under
certain conditions.
The primary purpose of legislation of this type has been
said to be ''to protect corporations, their directors, officers,
and employees against so-called 'strike suits' and the litigation
expenses which may be unjustifiably foisted upon them."
(Ballantine, Ab1tses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How

Far is California's New "Semwity for Expenses" Act Sound
Regulation? 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399.) In order to carry out this
purpose the New York Law (N.Y. Gen. Corp. Laws, S1tpra,
§ 61-b), the New Jersey Law (N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, §§ 3-14)
and the Pennsylvania Law (Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, §§ 1321
and 1323) each provides that the shareholder plaintiff post
security for the expenses of the corporation and the other defendants for whose costs the corporation may be liable (i.e.,
directors, officers and employees). However, they do not require that he post security for the expenses of third person
defendants who are neither directors, officers nor employees
of the corporation since the corporation which plaintiff elects
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to represent would not be liable for such expenses. In California section 834 purports to go considerably further than
the laws of its sister states in requiring the plaintiff shareholder to be liable for the attorney's fees of third party defendants even though the corporation itself could not be held
liable for such expenses. Such a provision is not only unwarranted but it is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws since it requires the plaintiff shareholder to post security
for the third party defendant's attorney's fees without imposing a corresponding liability on the third party defendant.
Some authorities hold that it is a prudent precaution to
attempt some reasonable regulation of derivative actions to
prevent strike suits, but I feel that the rule of Whitten v.
Dabney, supra, 171 Cal. 621, (limiting the shareholder's right
to settle derivative suits once commenced) and the provisions
of section 834 requiring security for the corporation's expenses are sufficient. I see no sound reason why the plaintiff
shareholder should be further limited by having to post
security for the expenses of third party defendants.
Granting that some restrictions are necessary it should be
remembered that "Great evil, however, will result if undue
obstacles are placed in the path of a shareholder who has
legitimate grounds for suing. The derivative action is practically the only remedy for calling the management to account
for its wrongs against the corporation and to obtain restitution." (Ballentine, Ab1tses of Shareholders Derivative Suits,
supm, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399, 416.)
For these reasons I feel there is no adequate basis for the
discriminatory provisions of section 834; that they violate
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and constitute an undue
impediment to the very necessary stockholder's derivative suit.
It must be remembered that the reported decisions of this
court show many instances in which stockholders of corporations have been defrauded and that many derivative suits have
been meritorious.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal.

